Edit distance based encryption and its application by Tran, Phuong Viet Xuan et al.
University of Wollongong
Research Online
Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences -
Papers: Part A Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences
2016
Edit distance based encryption and its application
Phuong Viet Xuan Tran
University of Wollongong, tvxp750@uowmail.edu.au
Guomin Yang
University of Wollongong, gyang@uow.edu.au
Willy Susilo
University of Wollongong, wsusilo@uow.edu.au
Kaitai Liang
Aalto University, kaitai.liang@aalto.fi
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au
Publication Details
Phuong, T. Viet Xuan., Yang, G., Susilo, W. & Liang, K. (2016). Edit distance based encryption and its application. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, 9723 103-119. Melbourne, Australia Proceedings of The 21st Australasian Conference on Information Security
and Privacy (ACISP)
Edit distance based encryption and its application
Abstract
Edit distance, also known as Levenshtein distance, is a very useful tool to measure the similarity between two
strings. It has been widely used in many applications such as natural language processing and bioinformatics.
In this paper, we introduce a new type of fuzzy public key encryption called Edit Distance-based Encryption
(EDE). In EDE, the encryptor can specify an alphabet string and a threshold when encrypting a message, and
a decryptor can obtain a decryption key generated from another alphabet string, and the decryption will be
successful if and only if the edit distance between the two strings is within the pre-defined threshold. We
provide a formal definition and security model for EDE, and propose an EDE scheme that can securely
evaluate the edit distance between two strings embedded in the ciphertext and the secret key. We also show an
interesting application of our EDE scheme named Fuzzy Broadcast Encryption which is very useful in a
broadcasting network.
Keywords
edit, application, distance, encryption, its
Disciplines
Engineering | Science and Technology Studies
Publication Details
Phuong, T. Viet Xuan., Yang, G., Susilo, W. & Liang, K. (2016). Edit distance based encryption and its
application. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 9723 103-119. Melbourne, Australia Proceedings of The
21st Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy (ACISP)
This journal article is available at Research Online: http://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/5812
Edit Distance Based Encryption and Its Application
Tran Viet Xuan Phuong1, Guomin Yang1, Willy Susilo1, and Kaitai Liang2
1 Centre for Computer and Information Security Research
School of Computing and Information Technology
University of Wollongong, Australia.
tvxp750@uowmail.edu.au, {gyang, wsusilo}@uow.edu.au
2 Department of Computer Science, Aalto University, Finland.
kaitai.liang@aalto.fi
Abstract. Edit distance, also known as Levenshtein distance, is a very useful tool to mea-
sure the similarity between two strings. It has been widely used in many applications such
as natural language processing and bioinformatics. In this paper, we introduce a new type
of fuzzy public key encryption called Edit Distance-based Encryption (EDE). In EDE, the
encryptor can specify an alphabet string and a threshold when encrypting a message, and
a decryptor can obtain a decryption key generated from another alphabet string, and the
decryption will be successful if and only if the edit distance between the two strings is within
the pre-defined threshold. We provide a formal definition and security model for EDE, and
propose an EDE scheme that can securely evaluate the edit distance between two strings
embedded in the ciphertext and the secret key. We also show an interesting application of
our EDE scheme named Fuzzy Broadcast Encryption which is very useful in a broadcasting
network.
Keywords: Edit Distance, Fuzzy Encryption, Dynamic Programming, Viète’s Formulas
1 Introduction
Measuring the similarity between two strings is an important task in many applications such as
natural language processing, bio-informatics, and data mining. One of the common similarity met-
rics that has been widely used in the above applications is the Edit Distance (a.k.a. Levenshtein
distance), which counts the minimum number of operations (namely, insertion, deletion, and sub-
stitution) required to transform one string into the other. In this paper, we investigate a challenging
problem of building fuzzy public key encryption schemes based on edit distance.
Our work is motivated by an open problem raised by Sahai and Waters in [21], where the notion
of Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) was proposed. The Fuzzy IBE scheme introduced in [21]
can be regarded as the first Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) scheme with a threshold access
policy. To be more precise, it allows to use a private key corresponding to an identity string I ′
to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with another identity string I if and only if the “set overlap”
between I and I ′ (i.e., |I ∩ I ′|) is larger than a pre-defined threshold. One of the open problems
raised in [21] is to construct fuzzy encryption schemes based on other similarity metrics.
We should note that edit distance is very different from the “set overlap” distance used in
Fuzzy IBE. For example, consider the biometric identity application of Fuzzy IBE described in
[21], given two strings I = “ATCG” and I ′ = “GACT”, we have |I ∩ I ′| = 4 (i.e., the distance
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is 0). However, the edit distance between I and I ′ is 3. It is easy to see that the order of the
alphabets in those strings will affect the edit distance, but not the set overlap distance. This simple
example shows that to a certain extent edit distance provides better accuracy than the set overlap
distance in measuring the similarity of two strings. As another example, given an encryption string
I = “admirer” and a threshold distance d = 1, for edit distance, we can allow a decryption key
associated with I ′ = “admirers” to decrypt the message; while for set overlap distance, we can have
some totally unrelated anagrams of I, such as I ′ = “married”, whose corresponding secret key can
also decrypt the message. Due to the difference between the two distances (or similarity metrics),
we cannot easily extend the technique used in [21] to construct a fuzzy encryption scheme for edit
distance. Also, in order to distinguish our fuzzy encryption scheme based on edit distance from the
Fuzzy IBE proposed in [21], we name our new encryption scheme Edit Distance-based Encryption
(or EDE, for short).
1.1 This Work
In this paper, we introduce the notion of Edit Distance-based Encryption (EDE), formalize its
security, and propose a practical scheme in the standard model.
Edit distance can be measured in polynomial time using different techniques, such as dynamic
programming or recursion. However, in an EDE scheme, the two strings I and I ′ are embedded in
the ciphertext CT and the user secret key SK, respectively. Hence, the problem becomes how to
measure the distance of I and I ′ using CT and SK. We observe that the most important operation
in the edit distance algorithms is the equality test between two alphabets I[x] and I ′[y]. Based on
this observation, our proposed EDE scheme uses bilinear map [6] to solve this issue. We illustrate
our idea using the following example.
Suppose we have two strings I = “ATTGA” and I ′ = “AGTA”. We first encode each alpha-
bet as a group element. Then in the encryption process, we create a randomized vector I =
(As, T s, T s, Gs, As) using the same random number s. Similarly, we create another randomized
vector I′ = (Ar, Gr, T r, Ar) in the key generation process. Then we apply bilinear map to conduct
equality test between I and I ′ using the two vectors I and I′ which are included in the ciphertext
and the secret key respectively. The crux of the idea is illustrated in Figure 1. In order to deal with
the threshold problem, we apply the technique of Viète’s formulas [22] to solve the problem. In the
encryption process, we create a vector d = (1, 2, . . . , d, 0, . . . , 0) for the threshold distance d and
embed the vector d in the ciphertext. Also, based on the edit distance d′ between I and I ′, we create
another vector d′ = (1, 2, . . . , d′, ∗, . . . , ∗) where ∗ denotes the wildcard (i.e., don’t care) symbol.
Then based on d and d′, we ensure that the decryption can be successful if and only if d′ ≤ d. Also,
we overcome the issue of malleability by using the composite order group in constructing the EDE
scheme. We prove that our proposed scheme is selectively secure under the L-composite Decisional
Diffie-Hellman (L-cDDH) assumption.
We also show an interesting application of our EDE scheme named Fuzzy Broadcast Encryption
(FBE), which is very useful in broadcasting networks. An FBE scheme allows the encryptor (i.e.,
message sender) to specify a set of receiver identities during the encryption process, and a user can
decrypt the message if and only if the minimum edit distance between his/her identity and all the
identities chosen by the encryptor is below a threshold that is also specified by the encryptor during
the encryption process.
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Fig. 1. Edit Distance Evaluation using Bilinear Map
1.2 Related Work
Since the seminal work of Sahai and Waters [21], many Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) schemes
with the threshold access structure have been proposed (e.g., [9, 5, 11, 8]). In [9], Goyal et al. ex-
tended the work of Sahai and Waters to construct more expressive Key-Policy (KP) ABE where
the access structure is defined via a tree of threshold gates. Bethencourt et al. [5] proposed the first
Ciphertext-Policy (CP) ABE using the same access structure. Under the motivation of reducing
the ciphertext size, which is linear in the size of the encryption attribute set in most of the existing
ABE schemes, Herranz et al. [11] proposed a constant-size ABE scheme for the threshold access
structure, which is essentially the same as the set overlap distance metric used in Fuzzy IBE [21].
In [8], Ge et al. proposed another constant-size ABE scheme with the same threshold access struc-
ture but under a relatively weaker assumption. As of independent interest, some interesting fuzzy
encryption techniques have been proposed in the literature, such as [15, 17, 16].
Another type of fuzzy identity-based encryption is the Wildcarded IBE (or WIBE for short)
proposed by Abdalla et al. [3, 1, 2]. A WIBE allows wildcard symbols to appear in an identity
string used in the encryption process, and the wildcard positions will be ignored when measuring
the equality of two identity strings. Another notion that is similar to WIBE is the Hidden Vector
Encryption (HVE) [14, 12, 22, 18, 19], which also allows wildcards to appear in either the encryption
string or the key generation string. However, both WIBE and HVE are based on the fuzzy equality
test between two strings, which is different from the problem we aim to solve in this paper.
There are also a few works on the privacy-preserving edit distance evaluation between two strings
[4, 13, 20, 7, 23]. These works mainly focused on finding the edit distance of two (perhaps encrypted)
strings in a privacy-preserving manner, and hence is completely different from this work.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Edit Distance
Consider a finite alphabet set A whose elements are used to construct strings. Let ZI , ZD and ZS
be finite sets of integers. Let the function I : A → ZI be the insertion cost function, i.e., I(a) is the
cost of inserting the element a ∈ A into a given string. Similarly, define the deletion cost function
as D : A → ZD so that D(a) is the cost of deleting the element a ∈ A from a given string. Finally,
define the substitution cost function S : A × A → ZS so that for a, b ∈ A, S(a, b) is the cost of
replacing the element a by the element b in a given string.
Given two strings of length m and n, denoted by X ∈ Am and Y ∈ An respectively, consider
the sequence of insertion, deletion and substitution operations needed to transform X into Y and
the corresponding aggregate cost of the transformation.
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Definition 1. The edit distance between X and Y is defined as the minimum aggregate cost of
transforming X into Y .
The general definition of edit distance given above considers different weights for different opera-
tions. In this paper we will consider a simpler definition which is given below.
Definition 2. For all a, b ∈ A, let I(a) = D(a) = 1, S(a, b) = 1 when a 6= b, and S(a, a) = 0.
Then, the edit distance is defined as the minimum number of insertion, deletion and substitution
operations required to convert X into Y .
Dynamic Programming for Edit Distance Let X = X1X2...Xm ∈ Am and Y = Y1Y2...Yn ∈
An be two strings. We use M(i, j) to denote the edit distance between the two sub strings X1X2...Xi
and Y1Y2...Yj . The problem of finding the edit distance between X and Y can be solved in O(mn)
time via dynamic programming [10], which will be used in our scheme.
Let M(0, 0) = 0. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, define M(i, 0) =
i∑
k=1
I(xk), and M(0, j) =
j∑
k=1
D(yk).
Then, the edit distance M(m,n) is defined by the following recurrence relation for 1 ≤ i ≤
m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n:
M(i, j) = min
M(i− 1, j) +D(Yj),M(i, j − 1) + I(Xi),
M(i− 1, j − 1) + S(Xi, Yj),
 .
2.2 The Viète’s Formulas
Consider two vectors :−→v = (v1, v2, . . . , vL),−→z = (z1, z2, . . . , zL) where −→v contains both alphabets
and wildcard symbols (*) and −→z only contains alphabets.
Let J = {j1, . . . , jn} ⊂ {1, . . . , L} denote the wildcard positions in −→v . Then according to [22],
the statement (vi = zi ∨ vi = ∗ for i = 1 . . . L) can be expressed as:
L∑
i=1,i/∈J
vi
∏
j∈J
(i − j) =
L∑
i=1
zi
∏
j∈J
(i− j)(1).
Expand
∏
j∈J
(i−j) =
n∑
k=0
λki
k, where λk are the coefficients dependent on J , then (1) becomes:
L∑
i=1,i/∈J
vi
∏
j∈J
(i−
j) =
n∑
k=0
λk
L∑
i=1
zii
k(2).
To hide the computation, we choose random group element Hi and put vi, zi as the exponents of
group elements: Hvii , H
zi
i . Then (2) becomes:
L∏
i=1,i/∈J
H
vi
∏
j∈J (i−j)
i =
n∏
k=0
(
L∏
i=1
Hzii
k
i )
λk
Using the Viète’s formulas we can construct the coefficient λk in (2) by:
λn−k = (−1)k
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<ik≤n
ji1ji2 . . . jik , 0 ≤ k ≤ n.
where n = |J |. For example, if we have J = {j1, j2, j3}, the polynomial is (x− j1)(x− j2)(x− j3),
then λ3 = 1, λ2 = −(j1 + j2 + j3), λ1 = (j1j2 + j1j3 + j2j3), λ0 = −j1j2j3.
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2.3 Bilinear Map on Composite Order Groups and Its Assumption
Let p, q be two large prime numbers and n = pq. Let G,GT be cyclic groups of order n. We say
e : G×G→ GT is bilinear map over composite order groups if e satisfies the following properties:
(1) Bilinearity : e(ua, vb) = e(ub, va) = e(u, v)ab for all u,v ∈ G and a,b ∈ Zp; (2)Non-degeneracy :
e(g, g) 6= 1.
Let Gp and Gq be two subgroups of G of order p and q, respectively. Then G = Gp × Gq,
GT = GT,p × GT,q. We use gp and gq to denote generators of Gp and Gq, respectively. It is easy
to see that e(hp, hq) = 1 for all elements hp ∈ Gp and hq ∈ Gq since e(hp, hq) = e(gap , gbq) =
e(gqa, gpb) = e(g, g)pqab = 1 for a generator g of G.
The Decisional L−cBDHE assumption:
Let gp, h
R←− Gp, gq
R←− Gq, α
R←− Zn, Z = (gp, gq, h, gαp , . . . , gα
L
p , g
αL+2
p , . . . , g
α2L
p ),
T = e(gp, h)
αL+1 , and R← GT,p
We say that the decisional L−cBDHE assumption holds if for any probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm A:|Pr[A(Z, T ) = 1]− Pr[A(Z,R) = 1]| ≤ ε(k), where ε(k) denotes an negligible function
of k.
3 Edit Distance Based Encryption
An Edit Distance Based Encryption (EDE) scheme consists of the following four probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms:
• Setup(1n, Σ): on input a security parameter 1n, an alphabet Σ, the algorithm outputs a public
key PK and a master secret key MSK.
• Encrypt(PK,−→v ,M, d): on input a public key PK, a message M , a vector −→v ∈ Σn and a
distance d, the algorithm outputs a ciphertext CT .
• KeyGen(MSK,−→x ): on input a master secret key MSK, a vector −→x ∈ Σm, the algorithm
outputs a decryption key SK.
• Decrypt(CT, SK): on input a ciphertext CT and a secret key SK, the algorithm outputs
either a message M if EditDistance(−→v ,−→x ) ≤ d, or a special symbol ⊥.
Security Model. The security model for an EDE scheme is defined via the following game between
an adversary A and a challenger B.
• Setup: The challenger B run Setup(1n, Σ) to generate the PK and MSK. PK is then passed
to A.
• Query Phase 1: The challenger answers all private key queries for a vector −→σ by returning :
skσ ← KeyGen(MSK,−→σ ).
• Challenge: A submits two equal-length messages M0 and M1, a target vector −→v ∗ ∈ Σn and
threshold τ such that EditDistance(−→v ∗,−→σ ) > τ for any vector −→σ that has been queried in
Phase 1. The challenger then flips a coin β ← {0, 1} and computes the challenge ciphertext
C∗ ← Encrypt(PK,−→v ∗,Mβ , τ), which is given to A.
• Query Phase 2: same as Query Phase 1 except that EditDistance(−→v ∗,−→σ ) > τ for any vector
σ queried in this phase.
• Output: A outputs a bit β′ as her guess for β.
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Define the advantage of A asAdvEDEA (k) = |Pr[β′ = β]− 1/2|.
Selective Security. In the selective security model, the adversary A is required to submit the target
vector −→v ∗ ∈ Σn and threshold τ before the game setup, and A is only allowed to make private key
queries for any vector −→σ that satisfies EditDistance(−→v ∗,−→σ ) > τ throughout the game.
4 Edit Distance Based Encryption Scheme
In this section, we introduce our EDE scheme, which is based on the the Dynamic Programming
[10] algorithm for calculating edit distance.
– Setup(1n, Σ): The setup algorithm first chooses L = poly(n) as the maximum number of
length of a word that would appear in the encryption and key generation. It then picks large
primes p, q, generates bilinear groups G,GT of composite order n = pq, and selects generators
gp ∈ Gp, gq ∈ Gq. After that, generate
v0, v
′
0, b0, g, f, ω, h1, . . . , hL, u1, . . . , uL ∈R Gp, x1, . . . , xL, x′1, . . . , x′L ∈R Zn,
v1 = v
x1
0 , . . . , vL = v
xL
0 , v
′
1 = (v
′
0)
x1 , . . . , v′L = (v
′
0)
xL , b1 = b
x′1
0 , . . . , bL = b
x′L
0 ,
Rg, Rf , Rv0 , . . . , RvL , Rv′0 , . . . , Rv′L , Rb0 , . . . , RbL , Rh1 , . . . , RhL , Ru1 , . . . , RuL ∈ Gq,
G = gRg, F = fRf , Y = e(g, ω),
V0 = v0Rv0 , . . . , VL = vLRvL , V
′
0 = v
′
0Rv′0 , . . . , V
′
L = v
′
LRv′L , B0 = b0Rb0 , . . . , BL = bLRbL ,
H1 = h1Rh1 , . . . ,HL = hLRhL , U1 = u1Ru1 , . . . , UL = uLRuL ,
and set the public key and secret key as:
PK = {Y,G, F, (V0, . . . , VL), (V ′0 , . . . , V ′L), (B0, . . . , BL), (H1, . . . ,HL), (U1, . . . , UL)},
MSK = {g, f, ω, (v0, . . . , vL), (v′0, . . . , v′L), (b0, . . . , bL), (h1, . . . , hL), (u1, . . . , uL)}.
– Encrypt(PK,−→v = (v1, . . . , vn1) ∈ Σn1 ,M, d): On input the public key PK, a vector −→v =
(v1, . . . , vn1) with n1 ≤ L, it first generates for each alphabet vi a vector xi = (vi, 1, . . . , 1L),
and expands −→v to −→v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn1 , . . . , 1L) and sets
−→
d = (1, . . . , d, 0d+1, . . . , 0L). Then
choose s ∈R Zn, and Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5 ∈R Gq, and compute
C0 = MY
s, C1 = G
sZ1, C2 = F
sZ2, C3,i = (Vi
L∏
j=1
H
xij
i )
sZ3,
C4 = (V
′
0
L∏
i=1
Hvii )
s · Z4, C5,k,t = (V ′t (Bk
L∏
i=1
(Ui)
dii
k
)(
L∏
j=1
(Hj)
vjj
t
))s · Z5.
Set the ciphertext as: CT = (n1, C0, C1, C2, {C3,i}n1i=1, C4, {{C5,k,t}Lk=0}Lt=0).
– KeyGen(MSK,−→z = (z1, . . . , zm) ∈ Σm): Given a key vector −→z = (z1, . . . , zm), it generates
yi = (zi, 1, . . . , 1L) for each alphabet zi, and creates
−→σ = (1, 2, ..., L) and expands −→z to
−→z = (z1, z2, . . . , zm, . . . , 1L). Then choose r1, r2 ∈R Zn, and compute
K1 = g
r1 ,K2 = g
r2 ,K3,i = (vi
L∏
j=1
h
yij
i )
r2 ,
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
K4,0,0 = ω(v′0
L∏
i=1
h
zi
i )
r2 ((b0
L∏
i=1
(u
σi
i ))(v
′
0
L∏
j=1
h
zj
j ))
r1fr1
K4,1,0 = (b1
L∏
i=1
(u
σi
i )
i(v′0
L∏
j=1
h
zj
j ))
r1
. . . ,
K4,L,0 = (bL
L∏
i=1
(u
σi
i )
iL (v′0
L∏
j=1
h
zj
j ))
r1

,

K4,0,t = (b0
L∏
i=1
(u
σi
i )(v
′
t
L∏
j=1
h
zj
j )
jt )r1
K4,1,t = (b1
L∏
i=1
(u
σi
i )
i(v′t
L∏
j=1
h
zj
j )
jt )r1
. . . ,
K4,L,t = (bL
L∏
i=1
(u
σi
i )
iL (v′t
L∏
j=1
h
zj
j )
jt )r1

, (t = 1, . . . , L). Then set the user secret key as SK = (m,K1,K2, {K3,i}mi=1, {{K4,k,t}Lk=0}Lt=0).
– Decrypt(CT, SK): The decryption algorithm first executes the dynamic programming algo-
rithm for edit distance by following Algorithm 1 which returns a distance d′ = cost[lenv − 1],
the matching indices array pos[0][] for −→v and pos[1][] for −→z . It sets τ = L− d′, and applies the
Viète’s formulas to compute
Algorithm 1: Edit distance evaluation via dynamic programming
input : CT, SK
output: d′, pos
lenv = n+ 1;
lenz = m+ 1;
Creat cost[lenv ];
Creat newcost[lenv];
Creat pos[2][] //setup two arrays to store the position matching pos[0][] for vector v, pos[1][] for vector z ;
for i← 0 to lenv do
cost[i] = i;
end
k = 0;
for j ← 1 to lenz do
newcost[0] = j;
for i← 1 to lenv do
// matching current letters in both strings
match = (e(K2, C3,i−1) == e(C1, K3,j−1))?0 : 1 (1);
// store the i match in array pos[0], j match in array pos[1]
if i /∈ pos[0], j /∈ pos[1] then
pos[0][k + +] = i, pos[1][k + +] = j, ;
end
// computing cost for each transformation
replace = cost[i− 1] +match;
insert = cost[i] + 1;
delete = newcost[i− 1] + 1;
// keep minimum cost
newcost[i] = Math.min(Math.min(cost− insert, cost− delete), cost− replace);
end
// swap cost-newcost arrays
swap[] = cost;
cost = newcost;
newcost = swap;
end
// return the cost for transforming all letters in both strings and array list pos including pos[0], pos[1]
return cost[lenv − 1], pos;
• for the index set Ωv = {L\{pos[0][0], . . . , pos[0][d′ − 1]}} = {ω1, . . . , ωL−d′}
aτ−k = (−1)k
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<ik≤τ
ωi1ωi2 . . . ωik (0 ≤ k ≤ τ),
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• for the index set Ωz = {L\{pos[1][0], . . . , pos[1][d′ − 1]}} = {ω̄1, . . . , ω̄L−d′}
āτ−k = (−1)k
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<ik≤τ
ω̄i1 ω̄i2 . . . ω̄ik (0 ≤ k ≤ τ),
• for the threshold index set J = {j1, . . . , jτ} with j1 = d′ + 1, . . . , jτ = L
âτ−k = (−1)k
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<ik≤τ
ji1ji2 . . . jik (0 ≤ k ≤ τ).
Then recover M as:
M =
e(K2, C4) · e(K1, C2)
τ∏
k=0
e(K
1
ā0â0
1 ,
τ∏
t=0
Cat5,k,t)
âk
τ∏
k=0
e(
τ∏
t=0
K āt4,k,t, C
1
ā0â0
1 )
âk
· C0.
Correctness.
In Algorithms 1:
e(gr2 , (Vi
L∏
j=1
H
xij
i )
sZ3)
?
= e(GsZ1, (vi
L∏
j=1
h
yij
i )
r2)
e(g, vi)
sr2e(g,
L∏
j=1
h
xij
i )
sr2 ?= e(g, vi)
sr2e(g,
L∏
j=1
h
yij
i )
sr2
We then illustrate an example:
Input: “AAGTA”, “AAAGG”
Output:
− d′ = 2
− pos =< pos[0][], pos[1][] >, with pos[0][] = {1, 2}, pos[1][] = {1, 2}
In message recovery
C0 = M · e(g, ω)s
e(K2, C4) = e(g
r2 , (V ′0
L∏
i=1
Hvii )
s · Z4)
= e(g, v′0)
sr2e(g,
L∏
i=1
(hvii )
sr2)
e(K1, C2) = e(g
r1 , F sZ2) = e(g, f)
sr1
τ∏
k=0
e(K
1
ā0â0
1 ,
τ∏
t=0
Cat5,k,t)
âk =
τ∏
k=0
e(g
r1
ā0 ,
τ∏
t=0
(V ′t (Bk
L∏
i=1
(Ui)
dii
k
)(
L∏
j=1
(Hj)
vjj
t
))sat)âk
= e(g, v′0)
sr1
τ∑
t=0
xtat
τ∑
k=0
âk
ā0â0 e(g, b0)
sr1
τ∑
t=0
at
τ∑
k=0
x′kâk
ā0â0
L∏
i=1
e(g, ui)
sr1
τ∑
t=0
at
τ∏
k=1
(i−dk)
ā0â0
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L∏
j=1
e(g, hj)
vjsr1
τ∏
t=1
(i−ωt)
τ∑
k=0
âk
ā0â0 .
τ∏
k=0
e(
τ∏
t=0
K āt4,k,t, C
1
ā0â0
1 )
âk = e(ωā0â0(v′0
L∏
i=1
(hzii ))
r2ā0â0
τ∏
k=1
((
τ∏
t=1
(v′t(bk
L∏
i=1
(ui)
σii
k
)(
L∏
j=1
(hj)
zjj
t
))r1āt)âkfr1ā0â0 , G
s
ā0â0 Z1)
= e(g, ω)se(g, v′0)
sr2e(g,
L∏
i=1
(hzii )
sr2)
e(g, v′0)
r1s
τ∑
t=0
xtāt
τ∑
k=1
âk
ā0 e(g, b0)
sr1
τ∑
t=0
āt
τ∑
k=0
x′kâk
ā0â0
L∏
i=1
e(g, ui)
sr1
τ∑
t=0
āt
τ∏
k=1
(i−σk)
ā0â0 )
L∏
j=1
e(g, hj)
sr1zj
τ∏
t=1
(i−ω̄t)
τ∑
k=0
âk
ā0â0 e(g, f)sr1 .
5 Security Analysis for The Proposed EDE Scheme
Theorem 1. Assume that the Decisional L−cBDHE assumption holds, then for any PPT adver-
sary, our EDE scheme is selectively secure.
Let B denote the algorithm to solve the Decisional L−cBDHE problem. B is given a challenge
instance Z, T ′ of the problem, where Z = (gp, gq, h, g
α
p , . . . , g
αL
p , g
αL+2
p , . . . , g
α2L
p ) and T
′ is either
T = e(gp, h)
αL+1 or R ∈R GT,p.
B simulates the game for A as follows:
• Init: A submits a target vector−→v ∗ ∈ Σn, and target threshold τ . Let
−→
d = (1, . . . , τ, τ+1, . . . , L)
denote a vector of length L. We denote ind(
−→
d ) = {1 ≤ i ≤ L|di = 0} and ind(
−→
d ) = {1 ≤ i ≤
L|di 6= 0}, and ind(
−→
d )|φj as {i ∈ ind(
−→
d )|j ≤ i ≤ φ}.
• Setup: In this phase, B generates:
γ, ψ, v0, v
′
0, b0, g, f, h
′
1, . . . , h
′
L, u
′
1, . . . , u
′
L ∈R Gp, x1, . . . , xL, x′1, . . . , x′L ∈R Zn,
v1 = v
x1
0 , . . . , vL = v
xL
0 , v
′
1 = (v
′
0)
x1 , . . . , v′L = (v
′
0)
xL , b1 = b
x′1
0 , . . . , bL = b
x′L
0 ,
Ry, Rg, Rf , Rv0 , . . . , RvL , Rv′0 , . . . , Rv′L , Rb0 , . . . , RbL , Rh′1 , . . . , Rh′L , Ru′1 , . . . , Ru′L ∈R Gq,
G = gpRg, F = g
ψ
p Rf , Y = e(g
α
p , g
αL
p g
γ
p ),
Vt = g
v0xt
p Rvt , V
′
t = g
v′0xt
p Rv′t , with t = 1, . . . , L,
Bk = g
b0x
′
k
p
∏
k∈ind(
−→
d )
g
αL+1−id
i
ik
p Rbk , with k = 1, . . . , L,
Hi = g
h′i
p Rhi , {Ui = g
u′i−α
L+1−i
p Ru′i}i∈ind(−→d ), {Ui = g
u′i
p Ru′i}i∈ind(−→d )
The corresponding master secret key components are: g = gp, f = g
ψ
p , hi = g
h′i
p , {ui = g
u′i−α
L+1−i
p }i∈ind(−→d ),
{ui = g
u′i
p }i∈ind(−→d ), vt = v
xt
0 , v
′
t = v
′
0
xt , with t = 1, . . . , L, bk = b
x′t
0
∏
i∈ind(
−→
d )
gα
L+1−idi
p , with k =
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1, . . . , L. Notice that the master key component ω is gα
L+1+αγ
p . Since B does not have g
αL+1
p ,
B cannot compute ω directly.
• Query Phase 1: A queries the user secret key for a string −→z = (z1, z2, . . . , zm) under the
constraint that EditDistance(−→v ∗,−→z ) > τ . Assume EditDistance(−→v ∗, −→z ) = σ and denote
−→σ = (1, 2, . . . , σ, 0, . . . , 0) and
−→
d = (1, 2, . . . , τ, 0, . . . , 0). Note that since σ > τ , there exists at
least one position i such that di = 0 and σi 6= 0. Let φ ∈ ind(
−→
d ) be the smallest integer such
that σφ 6= dφ.
B simulates the user key generation process as follows:
K4,0,0 = ω(v
′
0
L∏
i=1
hw̄ii )
r2(b0
L∏
i=1
(uσii ))
r1(v′0
L∏
i=1
hw̄ii ))
r1fr1
= gα
L+1+αγ
p (v
′
0
L∏
i=1
hw̄ii )
r2(gb0p
∏
i∈ind(
−→
d )
gα
L+1−idi
p
∏
ind(−→σ )
(gu
′
i−α
L+1−i
)σi
·
∏
ind(−→σ )
(gu
′
i)σi)r1(v′0
L∏
j=1
h
w̄j
j )
r1fr1
def
= gα
L+1+αγ
p (v
′
0
L∏
i=1
uw̄ii )
r2(gXp )
r1(v′0
L∏
i=j
h
w̄j
j )
r1fr1
where X =
∑
ind(
−→
d )
αn+1−idi+b0+
∑
ind(−→σ )(u
′
i−αL+1−i)σi+
∑
ind(−→σ ) u
′
iσi. Since
∑
ind(−→σ )(u
′
i−
αL+1−i)σi +
∑
ind(−→σ ) u
′
iσi = −
∑
ind(−→σ ) α
L+1−iσi +
∑L
i=1 u
′
iσi, and recall σi = di for i ∈
ind(
−→
d )|φ−11 and σφ 6= dφ. Hence, we have:
X =
∑
ind(
−→
d )|φ1
αL+1−i(di − σi) +
∑L
i=1 u
′
iσi + b0 = α
L+1−φ∆φ +
∑L
i=1 u
′
iσi + y
where ∆φ = (dφ − σφ). Then we choose r̂, r′2 randomly in Zn, and set r1 = −α
φ
∆φ
+ r′1, r2 = r
′
2.
Then K4,0,0 can be represented as:
K4,0,0 = g
αL+1+αγ
p (v
′
0
L∏
i=1
(hi)
w̄i)r
′
2 · (gα
L+1−φ∆φ+
∑L
i=1 u
′
iσi
p )
−αφ
∆φ
+r′1(v′0
L∏
j=1
h
w̄j
j ))
−αφ
∆φ
+r′1f
−αφ
∆φ
+r′1
= gα
L+1+αγ
p (v
′
0
L∏
i=1
hw̄ii )
r′2 · g−αL+1p (g
αL+1−φ∆φ
p )r
′
1(g
∑L
i=1 u
′
iσi
p )
−αφ
∆φ
+r′1
(v′0
L∏
j=1
h
w̄j
j ))
−αφ
∆φ
+r′1f
−αφ
∆φ
+r′1
= (v′0
L∏
i=1
hw̄ii )
r′2 · (gα
L+1−φ∆φ
p )r
′
1(g
∑L
i=1 u
′
iσi
p )
−αφ
∆φ
+r′1(v′0
L∏
j=1
h
w̄j
j ))
−αφ
∆φ
+r′1f
−αφ
∆φ
+r′1
Then we simulate T4,k,t with k, t 6= 0 as:
T4,k,t = ((bk
L∏
i=1
(ui
Lσi
i )(v
′
t
L∏
j=1
hw̄ii
t
i ))
r1
= (gbkp
∏
φ∈ind(
−→
d )|Lφ+1
g
αL+1−φdφ
p
∏
φ∈ind(−→σ )|Lφ+1
(gu
′
φ−α
L+1−φ
)σφ ·
∏
φ∈ind(−→σ )
(gu
′
φ)σφ)
−αφ
∆φ
+r′1
·(v′t
L∏
j=1
h
w̄ji
t
j ))
−αφ
∆φ
+r′1
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Next, it generates for each alphabet in −→z :

y1 = (z1, 1, . . . , 1L)
. . . ,
ym = (zm, 1, . . . , 1L)
, then computes K3,i =
(vi
L∏
j=1
h
yij
i )
r′2 . Other elements in the key can also be simulated: K1 = g
r1 = g
−αφ
∆φ
+r′1 ,K2 = g
r′2 .
• Challenge: A sends two message M0,M1 to B. The challenger then flips a coin β ← {0, 1}.
First, B generates for each alphabet in−→v ∗:

x∗1 = (v1, 1, . . . , 1L)
. . . ,
x∗m = (vm, 1, . . . , 1L)
, then generates Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5
R←−
Gq and sets:
C0 = Mb · T ′ · e(gαp , h)γ , C1 = hZ1, C2 = hψZ2, C3,i = h
v0xi+
L∑
j=1
h′ix
∗
i,j
Z3,
C4 = h
v′0+
L∑
i=1
h′iv
∗
i
Z4, C5,k,t = h
bkx
′
k
L∑
i=1
u′idii
k+v′t
L∑
j=1
v∗j h
′
jj
t
Z5
where h = gcp for some unknown c ∈ Zp. B returns the challenge ciphertext
CT ∗ = (n1, C1, C2, {C3,i}n1i=1, C4, {{C5,k,t}
L
k=0}Lt=0)
to A. If T ′ = T = e(gp, h)
αL+1, then:
C0 = Mb · e(gp, gcp)α
L+1
· e(gαp , gcp)γ = Mb · e(gp, gα
L+1
p )
c · e(gαp , gγp )c = Mb · Y c
C1 = (g
c
p) · Z1 = Gc · Z ′1, C2 = (gcp)ψ · Z2 = F c · Z ′2,
C3,i = (g
c
p)
v0xi+
L∑
j=1
h′ix
∗
i,j
Z3 = (g
v0xi+
L∑
j=1
h′ix
∗
i,j
p )
cZ3 = (Vi
L∏
j=1
H
x∗ij
i )
c · Z ′3,
C4 = (g
c
p)
v′0+
L∑
i=1
h′iv
∗
i · Z4 = ((gp)
v′0+
L∑
i=1
h′iv
∗
i
)c · Z4 = (V ′0
L∏
i=1
H
v∗i
i )
c · Z ′4.
C5,k,t = (g
c
p)
bkx
′
k
L∑
i=1
u′idii
k+v′t
L∑
j=1
v∗j h
′
jj
t
· Z5 = ((gp)
bkx
′
k
L∑
i=1
u′idii
k+v′t
L∑
j=1
v∗j h
′
jj
t
)c · Z5.
= (V ′t (Bk
L∏
i=1
(Ui)
dii
k
)(
L∏
j=1
(Hj)
v∗j j
t
))c · Z ′5.
the challenge ciphertext is a valid encryption of Mb. On the other hand, when T
′ is uniformly
distributed in GT,p, the challenge ciphertext is independent of b.
• Query Phase 2: Same as Phase 1.
• Guess: A output b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b′ = b then B outputs 1; otherwise outputs 0.
If b′ = 0, then the simulation is the same as in the real game. Hence, A will have the probability
1
2 + ε to guess b correctly. If b
′ = 1, then T ′ is random in GT,p, then A will have probability 12 to
guess b correctly.
Therefore, B can solve the Decisional L−cBDHE assumption also with advantage ε. 
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6 Extension - Fuzzy Broadcast Encryption (FBE)
We demonstrate an extension of the proposed EDE scheme to achieve Fuzzy Broadcast Encryption.
To illustrate how the scheme works, let’s consider the following example. Suppose we encrypt
a message under a keyword vector W = {Labour Party,Defence Unit} and a threshold distance
d = 2. Subsequently, people who have the attributes related to the keyword w = Labor Party
or w′ = Defense Unit can decrypt the message since the minimum edit distance between w (w′,
respectively) and all the keywords in W is 1, which is less than the threshold d = 2.
6.1 Definition
A Fuzzy Broadcast Encryption (FBE) scheme consists of the following four probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithms:
• Setup(1n, Σ): on input a security parameter 1n, an alphabet Σ, the algorithm outputs a public
key PK and the corresponding master secret key MSK.
• Encrypt(PK,M,W = (w1,l1 , w2,l2 , . . . , wk,lk) ∈ Σn1 , d): on input a public key PK, a list of
k keywords W = (w1,l1 , w2,l2 , . . . , wk,lk) in which each keyword wi,li has li characters, and a
threshold distance d, the algorithm outputs a ciphertext CT .
• Key Gen(MSK,w ∈ Σm): on input the master secret key MSK and a keyword w of length
m, the algorithm outputs a secret key SKw.
• Decrypt(CT, SKw): on input a ciphertext CT with keywords W = (w1,l1 , w2,l2 , . . . , wk,lk) and
a secret key SKw with keyword w, the algorithm outputsM ifMin{EditDistance(wi,li , w)}ki=1 ≤
d, or ⊥ otherwise.
6.2 Security Model
The security model for a FBE scheme is defined via the following game between an adversary A
and a challenger B.
• Setup: The challenger B runs Setup(1n, Σ) to generate PK and MSK. PK is then passed to
A.
• Query Phase 1: The challenger answers private key queries for any keyword w by returning
skw ← KeyGen(MSK,w).
• Challenge: A submits two equal-length messages M0 and M1, a target set of keywords W ∗ =
{Wi,li}ki=1, and a threshold τ such that Min{EditDistance(Wi,li , w)}ki=1 > τ for all keywords
w that have been queried in Phase 1. The challenger then flips a coin β ← {0, 1}, and computes
the challenge ciphertext C∗ ← Encrypt(PK,Mβ , {Wi,li}ki=1, τ) which is given to A.
• Query Phase 2: same as Query Phase 1 under the restriction that Min{EditDistance(Wi,li ,
w)}ki=1 > τ for any keyword w queried.
• Output: A outputs a bit β′ as her guess for β.
Define the advantage of A as: AdvFBEA (k) = |Pr[β′ = β]− 1/2|.
Selective Security. In the selective model, the adversary A is required to submit the target vector
W ∗ and threshold τ before the game setup.
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6.3 FBE Scheme
Below we present a FBE scheme based on our EDE scheme.
– Setup(1n, Σ): The setup algorithm first chooses L = poly(n) as the maximum number of
length of a word that would appear in the encryption and key generation. It then picks large
primes p, q, generates bilinear groups G,GT of composite order n = pq, and selects generators
gp ∈ Gp, gq ∈ Gq. After that, generate
v0, v
′
0, b0, g, f, ω, h1, . . . , hL, u1, . . . , uL ∈R Gp, x1, . . . , xL, x′1, . . . , x′L ∈R Zn,
v1 = v
x1
0 , . . . , vL = v
xL
0 , v
′
1 = (v
′
0)
x1 , . . . , v′L = (v
′
0)
xL , b1 = b
x′1
0 , . . . , bL = b
x′L
0 ,
Rg, Rf , Rv0 , . . . , RvL , Rv′0 , . . . , Rv′L , Rb0 , . . . , RbL , Rh1 , . . . , RhL , Ru1 , . . . , RuL ∈ Gq,
G = gRg, F = fRf , Y = e(g, ω),
V0 = v0Rv0 , . . . , VL = vLRvL , V
′
0 = v
′
0Rv′0 , . . . , V
′
L = v
′
LRv′L , B0 = b0Rb0 , . . . , BL = bLRbL ,
H1 = h1Rh1 , . . . ,HL = hLRhL , U1 = u1Ru1 , . . . , UL = uLRuL ,
and set the public key and secret key as:
PK = {Y,G, F, (V0, . . . , VL), (V ′0 , . . . , V ′L), (B0, . . . , BL), (H1, . . . ,HL), (U1, . . . , UL)},
MSK = {g, f, ω, (v0, . . . , vL), (v′0, . . . , v′L), (b0, . . . , bL), (h1, . . . , hL), (u1, . . . , uL)}.
– Encrypt(PK,W = (w1,l1 , w2,l2 , . . . , wk′,lk′ ),M, d): On input the public key PK, a list of k
keywords W = (w1,l1 , w2,l2 , . . . , wk′,lk′ ) in which each keyword wi,li has li alphabets, it first
generates for each alphabet wi,j in keyword wi,li a vector
x11 = (w11, 1, . . . , 1L), . . . ,x1l1 = (w1l1 , 1, . . . , 1L),
. . .
xk′1 = (wk′1, 1, . . . , 1L), . . . ,xk′l′k = (wk′lk′ , 1, . . . , 1L).
Define 
w1 = (w11, w1,2, . . . , w1,l1 , . . . , 1L),
. . . ,
wk′ = (wk′1, wk′2, . . . , wk′,lk′ , . . . , 1L),
and
−→
d = (1, . . . , d, 0d+1, . . . , 0L). Then choose s ∈R Zn, and Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5 ∈R Gq, and
compute
C0 = MY
s, C1 = G
sZ1, C2 = F
sZ2, C3,δ,i = (Vi
L∏
j=1
H
xδij
i )
sZ3,
C4,δ = (V
′
0
L∏
i=1
Hwδii )
s · Z4, C5,k,δ,t = (V ′t (Bk
L∏
i=1
(Ui)
dii
k
)(
L∏
j=1
(Hj)
vδjj
t
))s · Z5.
Set the ciphertext as: CT = ({lδ}k
′
δ=1, C0, C1, C2, {{C3,δ,i}k
′
δ=1}
lδ
i=1, {C4,δ}k
′
δ=1, {{{C5,k,δ,t}Lk=0}k
′
δ=1}Lt=0).
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– KeyGen(MSK, w̄ = (w̄1, . . . , w̄m) ∈ Σm): given a keyword w̄ of length m, it generates yi =
(w̄i, 1, . . . , 1L) for each alphabet w̄i, and creates
−→σ = (1, 2, ..., L) and expands w̄ to w̄ =
(z1, z2, . . . , zm, . . . , 1L). Then choose r1, r2 ∈R Zn, and compute
K1 = g
r1 ,K2 = g
r2 ,K3,i = (vi
L∏
j=1
h
yij
i )
r2 ,

K4,0,0 = ω(v′0
L∏
i=1
h
w̄i
i )
r2 ((b0
L∏
i=1
(u
σi
i ))(v
′
0
L∏
j=1
h
w̄j
j ))
r1fr1
K4,1,0 = (b1
L∏
i=1
(u
σi
i )
i(v′0
L∏
j=1
h
w̄j
j ))
r1
. . . ,
K4,L,0 = (bL
L∏
i=1
(u
σi
i )
iL (v′0
L∏
j=1
h
w̄j
j ))
r1

,

K4,0,t = (b0
L∏
i=1
(u
σi
i )(v
′
t
L∏
j=1
h
w̄j
j )
jt )r1
K4,1,t = (b1
L∏
i=1
(u
σi
i )
i(v′t
L∏
j=1
h
w̄j
j )
jt )r1
. . . ,
K4,L,t = (bL
L∏
i=1
(u
σi
i )
iL (v′t
L∏
j=1
h
w̄j
j )
jt )r1

, for t = 1, . . . , L. Then set the secret key as SK = (m,K1,K2, {K3,i}mi=1, {{K4,k,t}Lk=0}Lt=0).
– Decrypt(CT, SK): The decryption algorithm first executes the dynamic programming algo-
rithm for edit distance by following Algorithm 2 which returns a minimum distance d′, the
index posw of the corresponding keyword w in W , the matching indices array pos[0][] for w and
pos[1][] for w̄. It sets τ = L− d′, and applies the Viète’s formulas to compute
• for the index set Ωv = {L\{pos[0][0], . . . , pos[0][d′ − 1]}} = {ω1, . . . , ωL−d′}
aτ−k = (−1)k
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<ik≤τ
ωi1ωi2 . . . ωik (0 ≤ k ≤ τ)
• for the index set Ωz = {L\{pos[1][0], . . . , pos[1][d′ − 1]}} = {ω̄1, . . . , ω̄L−d′}
āτ−k = (−1)k
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<ik≤τ
ω̄i1 ω̄i2 . . . ω̄ik (0 ≤ k ≤ τ)
• for the index set J = {j1, . . . , jτ} with j1 = d′ + 1, . . . , jτ = L
âτ−k = (−1)k
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<ik≤τ
ji1ji2 . . . jik (0 ≤ k ≤ τ).
Then recover M as
M =
e(K2, C4,posw) · e(K1, C2)e(K
1
ā0
1 ,
τ∏
t=0
Cat5,k,posw,t)
e(
τ∏
t=0
K āt4,k,t, C
1
ā0
1 )
· C0.
Theorem 2. Assume that the Decisional L−cBDHE assumption holds, then for any PPT adver-
sary, our FBE scheme is selectively secure.
The security proof follows that of Theorem 1 and is omitted here.
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Algorithm 2: Multi-keyword Edit Distance Evaluation via Dynamic Programming
input : CT, SK
output: distance d′, index posw, array pos[2][]
Create Array[len(W )];
Create pos[2][];
Create Array < pos > aPos;
for θ ← 1 to len(W ) do
lenv = nθ + 1;
lenz = m+ 1;
Creat cost[lenv ];
Creat newcost[lenv ];
for i← 0 to lenv do
cost[i] = i;
end
k = 0;
for j ← 1 to lenz do
newcost[0] = j;
for i← 1 to lenv do
match = (e(K1, C3,θ,i−1) == e(C1,K3,j−1))?0 : 1;
if i /∈ pos[0], j /∈ pos[1] then
pos[0][k ++] = i, pos[1][k ++] = j, ;
end
aPos.add(pos);
cost− replace = cost[i− 1] +match;
cost− insert = cost[i] + 1;
cost− delete = newcost[i− 1] + 1;
newcost[i] =Math.min(Math.min(cost− insert, cost− delete), cost− replace);
end
swap[] = cost;
cost = newcost;
newcost = swap;
end
Array[t++] = cost[lenv − 1];
Refresh pos;
end
return Min(Array[]), posw = index[Array[i] ==Min(Array[])], pos = aPos[posw];
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We introduced a new type of fuzzy public key encryption in this paper. Our new encryption scheme,
called Edit Distance-based Encryption (EDE), allows a user associated with an identity or attribute
string to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted under another string if and only if the edit distance between
the two strings are within a threshold specified by the encrypter. We provide the formal definition,
security model, and a concrete EDE scheme in the standard model. We also showed an extension
of our EDE scheme for fuzzy broadcast encryption.
Our EDE scheme cannot preserve the privacy of the keyword used for encryption due to the way
used by the dynamic programming algorithm to check the matching positions of two keywords. We
leave the construction of an anonymous EDE scheme, which implies a Fuzzy Public-key Encryption
with Keyword Search scheme, as our future work.
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